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A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LAW AND
POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
JB RUHL* AND JAMES SALZMAN'
This article assesses the approaches that different national governments have
employed to provide and conserve ecosystem services, focusing on policy instruments
and common-law court decisions. Applying the lessons learned from this review, we
address strategies for conservation of mangrove ecosystem services in Australia,
focusing on the importance of creating a strong political mandate and demonstrating
a clear connection between mangrove conservation and the benefits provided by
mangrove services. This requires further research on which beneficiaries would be
harmed, and by how much, if the mangrove service flows are reduced. Policy uptake
can be slow. It has taken years in other jurisdictions for policies protecting ecosystem
services to be adopted, and this will likely be the path in Australia as well.
I INTRODUCTION
Humanity has always benefited from our environment. Ecosystem goods - the
physical items that an ecosystem provides - are obvious. We look to forests for
timber, and coastal marshes for shellfish. Less visible, though no less important,
our environment also provides services. These ecosystem services provide the
conditions and processes that sustain human life.' If you doubt this, consider how
to grow an apple without pollination, pest control or soil fertility.
Once one realises the importance of ecosystem services, three points quickly
emerge: (1) landscapes provide a stream of services ranging from water quality
and flood control to climate stability, the economic value of which can be
significant; (2) the vast majority of these services are public goods and not
exchanged in markets, and so landowners have little incentive to provide these
positive externalities; and (3) government therefore needs to think creatively
about policies to provide these services.
* David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law, Director, Program on Law and Innovation, and Co-
Director, Energy, Environment and Land Use Program, vanderbilt Law School.
f Donald Bren Distinguished Professor of Environmental Law, joint appointment with the University
of california, Los Angeles, Law School and the Bren School of Environmental Science &
Management, University of California, Santa Barbara. This Article is based on presentations we
made at the Workshop on Ecosystem Services and the Law, University of Queensland Law School,
4 March 2020.
See, eg, Gretchen C Daily (ed), Nature's Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems (Island
Press, 1997) 3.
The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services
This article assesses the different approaches that governments around the
globe have employed to provide ecosystem services, spanning the breadth of
policy instruments as well as court decisions. We use mangroves in Australia as a
common example throughout. In Part II, we use the framework of 'the Five P's'
to lay out the different types of government policies to protect ecosystem
services, with a particular focus on payments. In Part III, we focus on the role of
common-law court doctrines to protect ecosystem services. Part IV recommends
policy tools to protect and enhance the services provided by mangrove
ecosystems.
II ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND THE FIVE P's
Despite the complexity of environmental aw and policy, there are only five basic
policy instruments that governments can apply. These can be captured through a
simple framework known as 'the Five P's'. These include Prescriptive Regulation,
Property Rights, Penalties, Persuasion, and Payments.2 There will rarely be one
best tool for a particular situation, and much of the challenge in instrument
choice lies in identifying each instrument's particular advantages and
disadvantages. In the sections below, each policy approach is set out and applied
to the protection of mangrove ecosystem services.
A Prescriptive Regulation
Prescriptive regulations mandate what parties can and cannot do. This is both the
most direct and the most common form of environmental aw. We see prescriptive
regulations at all levels of environmental governance - from hunting permits at
the local level and effluent limits under pollution laws at the national level, to
restrictions on foreign commerce in endangered species at the international
level.3 Also referred to as command-and-control regulation, prescriptive
regulation can be very effective in mandating uniform compliance across all
actors, preventing problems of free-riders and a race to the bottom. We can see
this policy instrument in play with mangroves through the requirement of a
permit for development hat will destroy or degrade mangroves.
4 No permit, no
development.
See James Salzman, 'Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental Law: The Five P's'
(2013) 23(2) Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 363.
3 For a thoughtful defence of prescriptive regulation, see Howard Latin, 'Ideal versus Real
Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory
Reforms' (1985) 37(5) Stanford Law Review 1267.
4 See generally Jody Freeman and charles D Kolstad (eds), Moving to Markets in Environmental
Regulation: Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience (Oxford University Press, 2007).
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Three unstated assumptions lie behind prescriptive regulation. The first is
that the regulator will set the standard at the proper level. This is not a given,
either because of inadequate information or agency capture (a classic problem in
the context of natural resources such as fish and timber, where industry pressure
has led to overfishing and large-scale clearcutting). The second assumption is
that the regulator will be able to monitor compliance with the standard. Satisfying
both of these assumptions imposes administrative costs that, as result, can
sometimes be a good deal higher for prescriptive regulation than for other policy
instruments.
The third assumption is that there will be sufficient political will for adoption
and enforcement. This is particularly challenging in jurisdictions where
development interests are politically powerful. In the case of mangroves, building
companies and aquaculture firms fight hard to allow conversion of mangroves,
making conservation of services particularly challenging.
B Property Rights
This instrument relies on privatising a resource by creating property rights.
Compared to prescriptive regulation, this approach should have lower
administrative costs. The government simply creates the property rights
(whether for grazing, biodiversity or wetland acres), allocates them initially, and
steps back, leaving future allocations to the market. Implicit in a 'property rights'
approach is the importance of technology. To enforce your right to exclude, you
need both to know that someone is making use of your resource (an issue of
monitoring capacity) and to have the ability to exclude others' use.
Prescriptive regulations can be combined with property rights through the
use of tradable permits in environmental markets. Here, property rights are
created for use of the resource. Trading systems use the market to make
prescriptive regulation more efficient. The government decides how much of a
harmful activity to permit (just as it would with prescriptive regulations), awards
private rights to engage in the activity up to the regulatory cap, and then permits
those rights to be traded. The market does not play a role in determining the
overall level of environmental protection; that is the role of the regulatory regime.
To make this more concrete in the context of ecosystem services, imagine
how a trading program would work with mangroves. Policy-makers decide that
there should be no net loss of mangroves. The government requires a developer
to hold a permit for every hectare of mangrove destroyed. Entrepreneurs create
new mangrove areas. These are assessed by a government agency and, if
approved, are issued permits that the 'mangrove bankers' can then sell to the
developers. If the system works properly, this mitigation or offsets approach will
ensure both development and no net loss of mangroves.
Vol 39(3) 505
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Mitigation banks for wetlands and species habitat have grown and now
constitute an annual market worth over $500 million globally.5 While relatively
simple in theory, this strategy can be difficult to implement. It requires a credible
regulatory driver and strong institutional infrastructure. Hence, they are only
found in developed countries with robust regulatory regimes.6 Determining the
appropriate currency has also proven challenging. Should, for example, an offsets
program for mangroves require offsets based on hectares developed or loss of
services? Put another way, offsets promise no net loss, but one needs to question
further: no net loss of what?
C Finandal Penalties
Short of banning an activity, another effective way to limit behavior that degrades
natural capital is to make it more expensive, whether through charges, taxes or
liability. By increasing the costs of harmful activities, such penalties force the
parties to bear the costs of their activities.7 To use economics language, the
polluter internalises the negative externalities of her behaviour. In our mangrove
example, developers might be charged a fee based on the area converted or loss of
service provision. The fee could be shifted up or down, depending on the desired
level of services.
In theory, financial penalties offer an attractive policy instrument, but there
are two practical obstacles. The first lies in getting the price right. Markets are
efficient when the prices for goods accurately reflect their full environmental and
social cost. A key aspect in internalising externalities, then, is valuation. If one
agrees that externalities should be internalised - that parties should pay for the
harm caused - the obvious question is 'how much'? How much are mangrove
services worth, and can they be accurately measured before development, when
the fee would need to be paid?
The second challenge is political. Increasing fees is never easy, and
environmental charges can seem harder still. And levying them at charges high
enough to influence behavior significantly is easier said than done. In many cases,
financial penalties for development that causes loss of services have been
intended more for revenue-raising than for serious behavior modification.
8
5 James Salzman et al, 'The Global Status and Trends of Payments for Ecosystem Services' (2018)
1(3) Nature Sustainability 136,139 ('Salzman Trends').
6 Ibid 138.
7 See, eg, Paul Ekins, 'European Environmental Taxes and charges: Recent Experience, Issues and
Trends' (1999) 31(1) Ecological Economics 39.
8 Ibid.
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D Persuasion
If prescriptive regulation and market instruments represent 'hard' regulatory
approaches, then a softer approach may be found in laws requiring information
production and dissemination. The theory behind such approaches is that the
government can change people's behavior by forcing them to think about the harm
they are causing and by publicising that harm.9 In the context of mangroves, the
government might launch an education campaign about the flood control and
biodiversity benefits that mangroves provide, or highlight through public service
announcements the harms resulting from loss of mangroves. It could launch a
'naming-and-shaming' initiative, calling out developers who destroy mangroves.
Information-based approaches like this are often used when there is inadequate
political support to impose market or regulatory instruments, or when such
instruments are ill-suited to the problem.10
E Finandal Payments
As noted above, just as government can use penalties to capture negative
externalities and make bad activities more expensive, it can use payments to
capture positive externalities and make good activities less expensive. In our
mangrove example, landowners might be paid for mangrove restoration. This is
the approach behind the popular strategy of payments for ecosystem services
('PES').
An obscure term just 15 years ago, PES has come of age - whether it is
described as 'natural capital', 'nature's fortune', or simply 'investing in nature."'
There are now over 500 PES programs around the globe, in both developed and
developing countries, with annual transactions worth well over $10 billion.1
In economic terms, PES seeks to internalise the positive externalities
generated by natural systems, creating incentives for landholder behavior that
ensures service provision. In some circumstances, PES can create additional
revenue streams for landholders that, on the margin, can push land management
toward conservation rather than development. This approach has been described
9 Eric WOrts, 'A Reflexive Model of Environmental Regulation' (1995) 5(4) Business Ethics Quarterly 779.
1O Ibid.
Gretchen C Daily and Katherine Ellison, The New Economy of Nature: The Quest to Make Conservation
Profitable (Island Press, 2002); Paul Hawken, The Ecology of Commerce: A Declaration of Sustainability
(HarperCollins, 2010); Mark R Tercek and Jonathan S Adams, Nature's Fortune: How Business and
Society Thrive by Investing in Nature (Basic Books, 2013).
u Salzman Trends (n 5).
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as 'making trees worth more standing than cut down'.13 It is important to
recognise, however, that PES captures only a fraction of the values provided by
natural systems. Existence values, option values, and many public goods benefits
are usually outside the scope of PES mechanisms.
Because PES programs have received extensive attention, we focus on them
in particular.4 There are three broad categories of PES mechanisms:
. Voluntary PES - Beneficiaries of ecosystem services agree to compensate
landholders for activities that maintain or enhance ecosystem services
delivery. There is no sanction for refusing to agree to the transaction. This
includes purchase of biodiversity offsets and carbon offsets by extractive
industries and companies motivated by corporate social responsibility to
reduce their habitat or climate change impacts. These are private
transactions where PES operates as a carrot.
" Subsidy PES - Public finance payments reward land managers for
enhancing or protecting ecosystem services. The buyer is a public entity
acting on behalf of the public good and not necessarily a direct beneficiary
of ecosystem services enhancement or protection. This includes
government programs in Costa Rica and China that pay landholders for
reduced deforestation or afforestation activities that enhance flood
protection, water quality or other ecosystem services. Here, public funds
operate as a carrot.
" Compliance PES - Parties facing regulatory obligations compensate other
parties for activities that maintain or enhance comparable ecosystem
services or goods in exchange for a standardised credit or offset that
satisfies their mitigation requirements. This includes water quality
trading, wetlands mitigation banking, and the European Union's
emissions trading scheme for greenhouse gases. Because the services are
purchased as a means of regulatory compliance, this mechanism operates
as a stick.s
Within these categories there is a wide range of specific mechanisms, reflecting
the creativity of policy-makers and entrepreneurs seeking to create revenue
streams for service providers. The table below sets out some of the more common
PES approaches.
1 James Salzman, 'The Eleventh Annual Gilbert and Sara Kerlin Lecture - Just What is the Emperor
wearing? The Secret Lives of Ecosystem Services' (2011) 28 Pace Environmental Law Review 591.
14 Robert Costanza et al, 'Twenty Years of Ecosystem Services: How Far Have We Come and How Far
Do We Still Need to Go?' (2017) 28(A) Ecosystem Services 1.
15 Salzman Trends (n 5)136.
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Table 1: PESApproaches
PES Transaction Sector Dominant Payment Carrot versus
Type Approach Stick




Instream Water Bilateral Deals Carrot
Buybacks
Trading and Water Credit Trading Stick
Offsets
Bilateral PWS Water Bilateral Deals Carrot
Wetland Biodiversity Bilateral Deals Stick
Mitigation Credit Trading
Biodiversity Biodiversity Bilateral Deals Stick
Mitigation Credit Trading
Voluntary Biodiversity Bilateral Deals Carrot
Biodiversity
Offsets
Compliance Carbon Offset Trading Stick
Forest Carbon
REDD+ Finance Carbon Public Finance Carrot
Voluntary Carbon Offset Trading Carrot
Forest Carbon
Certified All Certification and Carrot
Commodities Standards
Vol 39(3) 509
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The PES water sector is the most mature in terms of the number of programs, the
ages of programs, transaction value, and geographic distribution.1
6 Water is the
easiest context for PES because the connection between land management in an
upper watershed, and the direct health benefits to downstream users appear
straightforward. In many cases, transaction costs are low because institutions are
already in place to collect funds from diffuse beneficiaries, whether through
water utilities, budgets of water agencies or agricultural subsidy programs.17
The biodiversity PES sector offsets its losses to ensure that it suffers no net
loss. This sector is the least developed in terms of geographic scope and most
challenging for countries to put in place. Unlike in water PES, where those who
receive clean water and protection from flood are straightforward and local, the
beneficiaries of biodiversity are often spread out and the specific benefits indirect
or nonmaterial. Institutions that can collect fees for their many beneficiaries -
like water utilities - do not exist, and common metrics are difficult to determine.
Accordingly, there are only 36 countries that employ biodiversity PES programs,
and the most successful initiatives rely on regulatory drivers.18 The very practice
of offsetting is controversial. It faces strong opposition from NGOs that do not
wish to endorse habitat destruction.19
The compliance mitigation programs that restore stream and wetland
habitat benefit from strong regulations backed by credible enforcement and
common agreement on currencies of exchange (such as wetland acreage). This
sector is the least transparent. Data on transactions or project implementation are
not available. Global transactions are estimated at $2.5-8.4 billion annually - a
wide range indicative of the difficulties in tracking payments.20
Compliance biodiversity offsets and mitigation remain important
conservation mechanisms in a small number of developed countries such as the
United States and Germany, but they have not significantly spread to other
countries. There are no fully operational compliance-driven programs in Africa.
While the European Council adopted a 2020 Biodiversity Strategy calling for the
EU 'to ensure no net loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services', regulations have
not been produced on time and the Commission appears to favor a voluntary




S9 ee, eg, congressional Research Service, Wetland Mitigation Banking: Status and Prospects (Report
no 97-849,1997).
° Salzman Trends (n 5)137.
2 European Union, The EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 (2011) 24.
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mandating offsets in favour of voluntary schemes.22 These concerns over the
effect that offset rules could have on development suggest that many nations will
continue to favor voluntary approaches.
Compensatory mitigation banking is particularly relevant to mangrove
services. Transactions are estimated at $3.6 billion per year.23 But it has not spread
geographically. Almost all the growth has only occurred in countries where
wetlands are the largest habitat type offset - the United States, Australia, Canada
and Germany. It has been introduced in Malaysia on a voluntary basis, in Northern
Mariana Islands for compliance purposes, and is in the process of being piloted in
Colombia.4 In developing countries, permittee-responsible mitigation -
mitigation by the impacting party or a subcontractor - is the most commonly
found option for compliance. However, many countries (including Brazil,
Cameroon, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Mozambique and South Africa) allow
developers to compensate in lieu of offsetting, which is generally used to fund
conservation projects by the public sector or a Non-Governmental Organisation
('NGO').25
Mitigation banks take on the risks and complexity of undertaking an offset
from developers. They are created by entrepreneurs who develop habitat to host
particular species and then receive credits from regulators that can be sold to
developers to offset or mitigate their projects' harms to species populations.
Large mitigation banks can achieve economies of scale in design, maintenance
and monitoring. This enables them to protect larger, contiguous areas that offer
better ecological payoff than smaller, isolated permittee-responsible mitigation
projects. An effective mitigation system requires laws, monitoring of compliance,
and tough enforcement.26 Despite the market's size, data on credit prices is hard
to find, and relatively little market infrastructure (like brokerages, accounting
services and standards) has emerged compared to newer markets like carbon.27 It
also remains unclear whether the currency of exchange adequately reflects
ecosystem service values and can meaningfully ensure no net loss.
While the well-known PES success stories continue to generate enthusiasm
and interest for PES approaches, a close examination of the experiences to date of
the many types of PES mechanisms suggests a more nuanced picture. A small
Institute for European Environmental Policy, Biodiversity Offsets: What Did the UK Pilot Scheme
Achieve? (Web Page, 2016).
" Salzman Trends (n 5)139.
w+ Ibid 138.
5 Ibid.
26 James Salzman and JB Ruhl, 'Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law' (2001)
53(3) Stanford Law Review 607.
7 See, eg, Ecosystem Marketplace, State of Biodiversity Markets: Offset and Compensation Programs
Worldwide (Report, 2015).
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number of PES mechanisms (chiefly subsidy watershed, compliance habitat and
biodiversity, and carbon offsets) account for the majority of growth in number,
volume of transactions, size of transactions and geographic spread.28 The key
questions are: (1) Why have some programs grown to scale while others have not?
(2) What does this tell us about the broader issue of instrument choice in
environmental protection? We suggest that these questions can be addressed
through focusing on four key factors: motivated buyers, motivated sellers,
metrics, and low-transaction-cost institutions.
As with all exchanges, PES is driven by demand - ie the perceived scarcity
of ecosystem services. People do not buy what they feel they do not need. In the
PES arena, the scarcity may concern water quality, flood protection, climate
stability or biodiversity. If a service is not scarce (or is simply taken for granted),
there is no evident need to pay for it. Many PES mechanisms are purely private -
eg duck hunters pay farmers to keep grain on their fields or flood them, and cities
pay upper watershed land owners to keep trees standing rather than develop.
Landholders can choose to enter into these transactions or not. The challenge is
that many ecosystem services are public goods whose benefits cannot easily be
captured by discrete parties. As a result, complete reliance on private PES
transactions will prove insufficient in many settings to ensure the socially
optimal level of service provision.
PES instrument design addresses this issue by stimulating transactions
through regulation that creates demand. This prevents free-riding and
overcomes the collective action costs of organising diffuse beneficiaries. It is thus
no surprise that many of the largest PES programs are all based on transactions
mandated by compliance PES, such as mitigation banking. This also explains why
the PES mechanisms of compliance biodiversity, instream flow and water quality
markets remain limited to a small number of developed countries. The necessary
governance capacity of laws and institutions to create regulatory demand is
absent in most developing countries.
If PES payments are to provide services, then landowners must be paid, and
their behaviour must be sufficient to provide the desired service. Moreover, the
amount paid to landowners must be competitive with the opportunity costs. Put
another way, PES on its own will make trees more valuable standing than cut
down only if the service payments to economically motivated landowners are as
attractive as the value of timber. But in many settings, the revenue streams from
PES will not change landowners' behaviour and may need to be bolstered by
regulation or other strategies.
One can also stimulate service provision with subsidies such as watershed
PES financed through water utility bills or government payments. Apart from the
general debates over whether public funds should be paid to private landowners,
8 See generally Salzman Trends (n 5).
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a key practical challenge for PES subsidy programs lies in identifying those
landholders that are most important for service provision. This requires an
assessment mechanism to ensure the funds are spent most efficiently. There is no
real benefit in paying everyone to conserve wetlands. The focus should be on
wetlands with the potential to provide the greatest level of storm water
protection. Most subsidy programs, however, do not condition payments on
service provision capacity, either because of the transaction costs or because of
concern over achieving the dual goal of poverty alleviation.
F Summary
The previous sections have set out the policy toolkit for ecosystem services, with
a focus on PES. There is no doubt that governments can conserve and promote
provision of ecosystem services through application of any of the Five P's. They
key question, though, is whether this has happened on the ground.
Numerous governance institutions have embraced ecosystem services as a
broad policy goal.29 Yet, with rare exception, these have not progressed beyond
aspirational policy statements and vague regulatory provisions, with little
meaningful protection and restoration of ecosystem services on the ground in
applied contexts.30 Despite the capacity to incorporate ecosystem services more
widely and deeply into policy decisions and legal instruments, substantive
policies and binding legal provisions are hard to find. Generally, agencies do not
explicitly incorporate ecosystem services into permits or performance standards;
nor are they routinely considered in planning processes. When statutes or agency
regulations and policies do mention ecosystem services, implementation on the
ground (eg whether to issue a permit) often fails to consider them meaningfully.
Bell-James has found precisely this situation in Australia. She reports that
limited Commonwealth authority impedes the development of nationwide policy
and legal frameworks. In Queensland, the resource focus of laws has not
incorporated a multiple ecosystem services approach; nor has the protection of
specific resources (eg fish habitat, coast) led to explicit regulation to protect
services. Land development laws provide exceptions and other 'flexibility'
mechanisms, allowing developers and local authorities to continue destruction
and degradation of mangroves. As a result, mangrove services receive scant legal
protections.3'
29 Lynn Scarlett and James Boyd, 'Ecosystem Services and Resource Management: Institutional
Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities in the Public Sector' (2015) 115 Ecological Economics 3.
30 Stephen W Posner, Emily McKenzie and Taylor Ricketts, 'Policy Impacts of Ecosystem Services
Knowledge' (2016)113(7) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 1760.
3 Justine Bell-James, 'Integrating the Ecosystem Services Paradigm into Environmental Law: A
Mechanism to Protect Mangrove Ecosystems' (2019) 31(2) Journal of Environmental Law 291.
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The potential for agencies to protect and enhance service provision clearly
exists, but they have not fully grasped the opportunity. Where else, then, to look?
III JUDGING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
Most of the attention to the law and policy of ecosystem services has focused on
the incorporation of the ecosystem services framework by legislatures in statutes
and by administrative agencies in their regulations and policies, using the Five
Ps.32 But judges, particularly in common-law systems, can play an important role
in the propagation of new scientific models into law and policy, even in the
absence of concrete legislation and regulations doing so.33 This part assesses the
role of courts in protecting ecosystem services.34
Even without invoking the term 'ecosystem services', courts have described
specific types of ecosystem services as central to the development or application
of legal doctrine. For example, the public trust doctrine, particularly in its
American form, explicitly protects the benefits of ecosystem services such as
fishing, water supply and navigation.35 Recently, a Louisiana court identified
protection of coastal areas from flooding as another benefit of public trust
resources.36 Courts in the United States have identified specific services in
application of other common-law doctrines, such as a Rhode Island state court's
finding that depletion of the pollution filtration effects of a coastal pond would be
a public nuisance,37 and a New Jersey state court's finding that the benefits of a
public coastal dune system construction project must be taken into account when
calculating the compensation due for the use of eminent domain to obtain the
private lands.38 These are important judicial pronouncements, but they are few
and far between and do not expressly incorporate, and thereby advance, the
ecosystem services framework
An obvious question in response is, so what? As suggested by these decisions,
courts could advance protection of ecosystem services without ever mentioning
the term. They can point directly to flood control, groundwater recharge, and
other benefits of nature. Why would it matter, then, if they adopt the term
32 JB Ruhl and James Salzman, 'The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services' (2007) 22(2)
Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 157.
33 We use the terms 'judges', 'judicial', and 'courts' broadly to include all tribunals ranging from
administrative law judges to municipal courts to the highest judicial court of the nation.
34 This Part is based on a previous study in which one of the authors of this article, JB Ruhl,
participated. See Ori Sharon et al, 'Ecosystem Services and Judge-Made Law: A Review of Legal
cases in Common Law Countries' (2018) 32(A) Ecosystem Services 9. Further background on that
study, as well as updates and additional analysis of the results, is provided below.
35 JB Ruhl and James Salzman, 'Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine' (2006) 15(1)
Southeastern Environmental Law Journal 223.
36 Avenal v State, 886 So 2d 1085 (La 2004).
37 Palazzolo v State, 2005 WL 1645974 (RI 2005).
38 Borough of Harvey Cedars v Karan, 70 Atl 3d 524 (NJ 2013).
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'ecosystem services' to explain the importance of those benefits? We believe there
would be four important benefits. First, the framework provides the language and
methodology through which those specific service benefits can be classified,
compared and assessed. As courts adopt the framework, they could build a more
coherent and comprehensive doctrinal approach to their protection. A case about
sediment control from wetlands and another about storm surge protection from
dunes seem different at first, but unifying them under the ecosystem services
framework emphasises their similarities. Rather than developing wetlands
protection doctrine and dunes protection doctrine in parallel channels, courts
would be developing an overarching doctrine of ecosystem services. Second,
courts command respect. If they start using the terminology and concepts of the
ecosystem services framework, so too will parties, experts, lawyers and other
judges. Third, judicial endorsement also supports adoption by legislatures and
administrative agencies in legislative and regulatory text. Finally, purely as a
practical matter, the term 'ecosystem services' is searchable, simplifying the task
of finding cases that deal with these benefits of nature.
With all of those potential positive effects, one might expect the express
language and concepts of the ecosystem services framework to have crept into
judicial opinions through several sources. First, to the extent the framework is
expressly embedded in legislation, regulations and policies, litigation involving
those authorities would naturally lead courts to adopt the language of the
framework. And even if those public authorities do not expressly adopt the
ecosystem services framework, in litigation challenging the authorities
government attorneys could use the framework as a basis for defending the
authorities against claims of overreach. On the flip side, litigants might convince
a court that the failure of those authorities to adopt the ecosystem services
framework is somehow legally deficient. Also, a plaintiff might use the ecosystem
services framework to articulate the injury needed to establish standing to pursue
judicial remedies, even if the underlying merits of the litigation do not involve
ecosystem services. Judges involved in public-law litigation could also adopt the
ecosystem services framework on their own accord to frame and evaluate the
dispute. Lastly, as suggested by the common-law doctrinal cases discussed above,
parties or judges involved in tort and other common-law litigation could use the
ecosystem services framework to describe injury, causation and other relevant
features. In short, there are many ways judges could find themselves directly
working with the ecosystem services framework in their opinions.
Alas, notwithstanding the many avenues through which courts could adopt
and propagate the express formulations and language of the ecosystem services
framework, by and large they have not. Using searches for 'ecosystem services'
and related terms in legal databases, Sharon et al conducted a survey of case law
from seven common-law nations and found that, as of August 2017, only 113
published opinions of judicial tribunals mentioned the concept of ecosystem
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services.39 Most of these opinions (67) fell into a category that Sharon et al
described as 'peripheral', meaning that the ecosystem services concepts 'are not
central to the arguments or the decision made in the case - they serve to
contextualize the central themes of the case or are one of many factors in the
decision'.40 Such cases are not unimportant, however. Although some of them
involved a tribunal simply quoting passages from a regulation or pleading, many
involved meaningful use of ecosystem services concepts to contextualise the
litigation background and implications. Most of these (40) involved land
development disputes, primarily in Canada but also from Australia.4 Other cases
involved description of ecosystem services from water resources42 and general
recognition of the benefits of ecosystem services to humans.43
Sharon et al sorted the remaining 46 opinions - those going beyond
peripheral use - into four categories: (1) cases from the United States involving
use of ecosystem services concepts to establish legal standing; (2) cases involving
interpretation of existing laws and regulations; (3) cases involving agency
valuations of ecosystem services; and (4) cases from the United States involving
agency use of ecosystem services to implement a regulatory program." Australia,
Canada and the United States accounted for the vast majority of these cases.'5 At
least in those three nations, the ecosystem services framework is not a complete
stranger to the courts, albeit the relationship is in its earliest of stages. Indeed, a
case law update we conducted through Westlaw for those three nations and the
United Kingdom revealed no new cases moving beyond peripheral use of the
'ecosystem services' term,46 and we identified no published journal article since
39 Sharon et al (n 35). The seven nations studied were Australia, Canada, India, Philippines, South
Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. For the methodology, see ibid 10-11. Sharon et
al focused on common law nations given the prominent role courts play in forming and developing
legal doctrine, including in the environmental policy domain (at 10). Only one other empirical
study of the use of ecosystem services terminology by courts has been published: Roberto Pasten,
Martin olszynski and Michael Hantke-Domas, 'Does Slow and Steady Win the Race? Ecosystem
Services in Canadian and Chilean Environmental Law' (2017) 29(B) Ecosystem Services 240.
40 Sharon et al(n 35)11
0 Ibid 12,18-19. For an example from Australia, see Spencer v Commonwealth (2015) 240 FCR 282.
4 For an example from Australia, see Lee v Commonwealth (2014) 220 FCR 300.
For an example from Australia, see Franklin v Valuer-General [2013] QLC 10.
" Sharon et al (n 35), at 16-17, also discussed the connection between ecosystem services and the
public trust doctrine, although they found no cases making that connection explicit.
4 Ibid 13-16.
46 We conducted a case law update through August 2020 using the Westlaw United States and
Westlaw International databases, the latter of which covers Australia, Canada, and the United
Kingdom among the nations Sharon et al. studied. All of the 13 judicial opinions found using the
'ecosystem services' terms during this period did so in ways Sharon et al categorised as
peripheral-ie, quoting from party, expert, or other external materials and not addressing the
concept in any other manner. There were four such cases from the United States: Murray Energy
Corp v EPA, 936 F 3d 597 (DC Cir 2019); Northern Plains Resource Council v US Army Corps of Engineers,
2020 WL 1875455 (D Mont 2020); United States v Brace, 2019 WL 3778394 (WD Pa 2019); Wilderness
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Sharon et al identifying use of the term by the courts of any nation.47 While this
does not amount to an exhaustive search of every nation's case law, the
representative sample provided by Sharon et al and our update strongly point to
the conclusion that courts have not meaningfully used the ecosystem services
framework in substantive legal contexts.
What explains the dearth of judicial opinions adopting the ecosystem
services framework? A partial answer is that if it does not show up in statutes,
regulations and policies, litigation over those authorities is unlikely to fuel
judicial uptake unless judges reach out to use it on their own accord, which they
have done only sparingly.48 The more statutes and regulations that invoke the
ecosystem services framework, the more such cases we can expect to see. But that
leaves several of the other avenues described above unaccounted for. Why have
they not seen more action? We believe it is largely due to the failure of litigants to
appreciate the advantages offered by framing their arguments for courts through
the lens of ecosystem services. But it also is due in part to the need for scientific
research on ecosystem services to connect with the nitty-gritty practical
dimensions of litigation. Greater use of the ecosystem services framework by
litigants could, however, help spark that kind of research. We explain what we
mean with three example contexts: (1) standing to seek judicial relief; (2)
common-law remedies; and (3) environmental impact assessments.
A Standing
Although all the common-law court systems that Sharon et al studied require
some degree of specific personal interest - usually framed in terms of injury
caused to that interest - for a litigant to establish standing to seek a remedy in
the courts, only in the United States have court opinions dealt with a litigant
alleging injury to ecosystem services as the basis for standing.49 It is not clear
Workshop v US Bureau of Land Management, 342 F Supp 3d 1145 (D Colo 2018). There were three such
cases from Australia. see Parmac Investments Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2019] QPEC 32; Walters
v Brisbane City Council, [2019] QPEC 3; Gloucester Resources Ltd v Minister for Planning [2019]
NSWLEC 7. Canada and the United Kingdom accounted for the remaining six such cases. See, eg,
Peel Investments (North) Ltd v Secretary of State for Housing Communities and Local Government [2019]
EWHC 2143.
47 We conducted our journal article search update through Westlaw, Science Direct, Google Scholar,
and other journal databases.
4 Sharon et al (n 35), at 14-17, review several cases in which the court addressed agency action under
a statute or regulation that the agency defended through by expressly referencing ecosystem
services. For an example from Australia, see Abacus Funds Management v Sunshine Coast Regional
Council [2012] QPEC 46.
4 Sharon et al (n 35) 13-14.
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whether this is because that kind of standing claim is uncontroversial in other
nations, or has simply never been advanced.
Once again, so what? Why should litigants in environmental and land use
cases frame standing through the ecosystem services framework? For example, a
litigant challenging a government permit approving filling of a wetland area could
allege loss of groundwater recharge and increased pollution of an adjacent river.
What would be the advantage of using the ecosystem services framework to
articulate those injuries? To be sure, we are not suggesting that describing the
specific services at stake is unnecessary. Rather, upon detailing the different
injuries, invoking the ecosystem services framework can help demonstrate the
interrelatedness of those seemingly discrete injuries, thereby emphasising the
causal relationship between the challenged action and the alleged injury
supporting standing.
Alleging injury to the benefits one receives from ecosystem services thus
resonates with standing doctrine, but litigants must establish the factual
predicates and not simply rely on broad claims. Two cases from the United States
illustrate the point. In one, beekeeper and environmental organisations
established standing to challenge federal pesticide approvals on the basis that
they would suffer diminished ecosystem services provided by bees.50 In another,
however, a court rejected standing based on broad claims that allegedly
inadequate wetland habitat offsets imposed in a land development permit would
impair enjoyment of ecosystem services from an adjacent lake.5'Although several
factors help explain the different outcomes, specificity of the claim that the
challenged action would cause impairment of ecosystem services was one. 52
This illustrates the feedback between law and science that can be amplified
when litigants begin using new scientific concepts, in this case to establish the
requisite injury that entitles one to pursue judicial remedies. As litigants leverage
scientific research on ecosystem services to establish standing, that demand can
send signals into the research community regarding the scale and specificity of
field research needed to support the claims. Researchers, for example, could
develop methods for relatively fast and accurate measurements of service losses
that litigants' experts could apply in the field. As such claims become more
successful, litigants will use them more frequently, and so on. The key, of course,
is for litigants to start generating that demand by using the ecosystem services
framework to frame their alleged injuries.
50 Ellis v Bradley, 2014 WL 1569271 *13 (ND cal 2014).
51 Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v Schroer, 2017 WL 943942 (ED Tenn 2017).
52 Sharon et al (n 17) 13-14.
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B Common Law
Standing is a gateway into court, but the injury upon which it is based is not
necessarily what is at the heart of the litigation. In the pesticide case discussed
above, for example, once the injury to ecosystem services had been established,
the litigation was largely over the government's process and rationale for
approving the pesticide, not about compensating for the injury. By contrast,
common-law tort claims are typically about compensating for the injury.
Framing injury to ecosystem services as the basis for recovery in tort - eg as a
private or public nuisance - thus presents an opportunity for law-science
symbiosis even stronger than does the standing doctrine angle.53
This will be particularly true when a plaintiff is seeking monetary damages.
In the New Jersey state case mentioned above from the United States, in which the
court found the filling of a coastal marsh would constitute a public nuisance, the
outcome was that the court denied a property takings claim - ie denied the
plaintiff just compensation for a land development permit denial. Imagine,
however, a scenario in which the pond was filled and nearby landowners uffered
loss of ecosystem services in the form of sediment and nutrient abatement and
storm surge protection. Those injuries would surely be the basis for standing, but
far beyond that the plaintiffs would need to cinch down causation and quantify
actual losses in order to recover on the merits. Using the ecosystem services
framework to do so would emphasise the causal connection, leverage the
burgeoning ecosystem services research literature, and help guide future
research at appropriate field-level scales.
C Environmental Impact Assessment
Environmental impact assessment prior to government approval of major actions
has become a ubiquitous requirement across many nations. In the United States,
for example, the National Environmental Policy Act ('NEPA') requires impact
assessment for actions that federal agencies carry out, fund or authorise, which
covers a lot of ground.5' NEPA litigation often involves whether the action agency
adequately included and analysed all relevant impacts. Following the pattern
described above for standing and common-law actions, those impacts could
include effects on discrete ecosystem services, such as the impacts approval of
timber harvesting on federal land could have on carbon sequestration and
5 JB Ruhl, 'Making Nuisance Ecological' (2008) 58(3) Case Western Reserve Law Review 753; JB Ruhl,
'Toward a Common Law of Ecosystem Services' (2005) 18 (Fall) St Thomas Law Review 1.
5 42 USC 4332 (2)(C)(i).
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sediment into waterbodies. NEPA is a broad lens and there is little debate that an
agency could use the ecosystem services framework as a way of organising and
analysing such effects. 55 Again, why do so?
Whereas the use of the ecosystem services framework in the standing and
common-law tort contexts is primarily to improve understanding of causation
and degree of injury, NEPA is not a remedial statute. Its central purpose is to
improve agency decision-making and communication. We see incorporating the
ecosystem services framework into such environmental impact assessment
programs as producing several potential advantages. First, if used across the
array of agencies conducting assessments, the ecosystem services framework will
provide a common language, making assessments more accessible to
stakeholders. Doing so will also allow easier and more direct comparison between
assessments. Most significantly, however, is that unifying effects under the
ecosystem services umbrella demonstrates their interrelatedness and thus allows
better trade-off analysis.
To be sure, there are potential downsides to this approach, not the least of
which is that new methods and scientific research will be needed. 56 This partially
explains why federal agencies in the United States have not widely adopted the
ecosystem services framework in their NEPA analyses.57 To disrupt that inertia,
litigants could challenge agency assessments for lack of adequate integration of
the ecosystem services framework, arguing that treating the suite of services in
an unbundled form understates overall effects and obscures trade-off analysis.
Granted, that would be an uphill climb, as courts are reluctant to impose
methodology on agencies. In one case from the United States, for example, a court
refused to require an agency to quantify in monetary terms all lost ecosystem
service benefits in its NEPA analysis of a timber harvesting permit, concluding
nothing in existing law or regulation mandated such an approach. 58 But efforts to
force agencies to consider impacts on climate in NEPA analyses faced a similar
battle before the courts eventually mandated such analyses.59 Indeed, Australia
offers an example of litigants successfully challenging an agency permit approval
for lack of adequate attention to ecosystem services impacts in the required
economic impact assessment, leading to revocation of permits to expand a coal-
mining operation.60
55 Robert L Fischman, 'The EPA's NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services' (2001) 20(2) Stanford
Environmental Law Journal 497.
56 carrie Presnall, Laura L6pez-Hoffman and Marc L Miller, 'Adding Ecosystem Services to
Environmental Impact Analyses: More Sequins on a "Bloated Elvis" or Rockin' Idea' (2015) 115
Ecological Economics 29.
s7 Ibid.
58 Clinch Coalition v Damon, 316 F Supp 2d 364, 380 (2004).
59 David Markell and JB Ruhl, 'An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?' (2012) 64(1) Florida Law Review 15, 57-65.
6o Bulga Milbodale Progress Association I c v Minister for Planning and Infrastructure [2013] NSWLEC 48.
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IV PROTECTION OF COASTAL MANGROVE ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
We have now provided a tour of how policy instruments and courts have protected
ecosystem services in a number of nations around the world. Going from the
global to the local, what lessons can these experiences tell us about strategies to
protect coastal mangrove cosystem services in Australia?
For Australian mangroves in Queensland, Associate Professor Justine Bell-
James has concluded that the law
is not structured in a manner that ensures protection for these ecosystems ... The
Queensland legal regime appears to offer reasonably high recognition of mangrove
ecosystem functions, but does not take the final step of fully acknowledging and
protecting ecosystem services.61
So how can this be improved?
The starting point is the importance of politics. We find strong protection for
ecosystem service protections where there is a strong political mandate. Political
support is necessary for the simple reason that all of the Five P's rely on
government initiative. Given all the different interests pushing for governmental
intervention, mangrove protection needs to rise near the top. Often (indeed,
usually) this is at a local rather than national level, reflecting public concern. This
can come about when there are high property values. Owners who wish to
maintain protection of their houses from floods will often support policies that
keep mangroves (and their storm protection services) in place. More generally,
support for protection of services can be expected to increase when there is (1) a
perceived connection between ecosystem degradation and loss to human
communities, and (2) a clear, credible threat to the ecosystem. Both of these
depend on the importance of perceived scarcity.
Indeed, as a general matter, the most effectivze ecosystem conservation (by
both state and non-state actors) is driven from perceived scarcity of an ecosystem
service and the resulting threat of harm. Nor is this surprising. When government
restricts development or makes it more expensive, it needs a political justification
for the pushback that will inevitably follow. Mangroves provide key ecosystem
services of protection against storm surges, flood protection and wildlife habitat,
among others. When the perceived harm from depleted wetlands is significant,
political and private actors are more likely to mobilise to conserve their ecosystem
services. As a result, we believe that as a general proposition: effective policies or
court decisions protecting mangroves require a clear connection between mangrove
conservation and the benefits provided by mangrove services.
6 Bell-James (n 10).
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This places science and communication squarely in the picture.
Demonstrating the opportunity cost of not conserving mangroves requires
scientific and economic research. A factual case highlighting the economic
importance of mangrove service provision will almost always be the precursor to
laws and court decisions protecting mangroves. One strategy is to map where the
mangroves are located and where their benefits flow. This identifies which
beneficiaries would be harmed, and by how much, if the service flows are reduced.
Mapping of ecosystem services thus has become a dominant theme in scientific
research,62 but more work is needed to translate that knowledge over to policy
domains to influence political support.
Once there is political support to protect mangroves, then the Five P's and
courts can come into play, articulating the costs and benefits of different
conservation strategies to legislatures, agencies and courts. Does existing law
provide the authority to promote the ecosystem services framework? To answer
this, lawyers must identify gaps, exceptions and other potential impediments.
63
Working with scientists and economists, they must articulate the relevant
benefits and harms to legislatures, agencies and courts in the ecosystem services
framework.
V CONCLUSION
We well realise that incorporating ecosystem services protections into the law,
and then ensuring implementation, is far easier said than done. Our three key
words of advice, therefore, are: 'Do Not Despair.'
Policy-uptake takes time. Where we have seen the ecosystem services
framework penetrate policy and court opinions, the tide shifted slowly. Carbon
sequestration, which today dominates discussion of ecosystem services, was not
in the climate change policy mix/ecosystem services discussion three decades
ago. Wetlands, once deemed a nuisance by the US Supreme Court, were not
statutorily protected in the United States until the 1980s and were not recognised
in the agency rules as sources of ecosystem services until 2008.64 The US Forest
Service did not recognise national forests in the agency's rules as sources of
62 Francesc Barb et al, 'Mapping Ecosystem Service Capacity, Flow and Demand for Landscape and
Urban Planning: A Case Study in the Barcelona Metropolitan Region' (2016) 57 Land Use Policy 405;
Jeannette Sieber and Manon Pons, 'Assessment of Urban Ecosystem Services Using Ecosystem
Services Reviews and GIS-Based Tools' (2015) 115 Procedia Engineering 53.
63 For an example, see JB Ruhl, 'Ecosystem Services and the clean Water Act: Strategies for Fitting
New Science into Old Law' (2010) 40(4) Environmental Law 1381.
64 For this history, see JB Ruhl, James Salzman and Iris Goodman, 'Implementing the New Ecosystem
Services Mandate of the Section 404 compensatory Mitigation Program - A Catalyst for
Advancing Science and Policy' (2009) 38(2) Stetson Law Review 251.
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ecosystem services, particularly those beyond provisioning and cultural services
such as timber and recreation, until 2012.65 Coastal dunes, once flattened to make
way for development and views, are being reconstructed in recognition of their
ecosystem services through the massive project along the New Jersey shore
mentioned above.
The necessary work to promote law and policy to conserve mangrove
ecosystem services in Australia is underway. This article has set out a pathway for
greater appreciation and protection of their valuable ecosystem services.
65 For this history, see JB Ruhl and James Salzman, 'Ecosystem Services and Federal Public Lands: A
Quiet Revolution in Natural Resources Management' (2020) 91(2) University of Colorado Law Review
677.
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